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“Thinking I Was I Was Not Who Was Not Was
Not Who”:
The Vertigo of Faulknerian Identity
Philip M. Weinstein

The title is dizzying, and I expect during the next hour to be offbalance in a number of ways: off-balance in my moves back and
forth between character, text, context, reader, and writer; offcenter in my attempt to decenter our notions of identity itself;
off-base in my shift from the “legitimate scrutiny of Faulkners
work to less sanctioned considerations of ideology, psycho
analysis, and what we in this room are doing when we go to
conferences like this one and listen to scholarly papers for five or
six days. These are all issues of identity, I hope to show, and
thinking about them, I hope also to show, can make you dizzy. I
turn now to Quentin’s passage in The Sound and the Fury from
which I take my title quote:
When it bloomed in the spring and it rained the smell was every
where you didn’t notice it so much at other times but when it rained
the smell began to come into the house at twilight ... it always
smelled strongest then until I would lie in bed thinking when will it
stop when will it stop. The draft in the door smelled of water, a damp
steady breath. Sometimes I could put myself to sleep saying that
over and over until the honeysuckle got all mixed up in it the whole
thing came to symbolise night and unrest I seemed to be lying
neither asleep nor awake looking down a long corridor of grey
halflight where all stable things had become shadowy paradoxical all
I had done shadows all I had felt suffered taking visible form antic
and perverse mocking without relevance inherent themselves with
the denial of the significance they should have affirmed thinking I
was I was not who was not was not who. (210—11)'
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Spurred by the overpowering smell of honeysuckle, Quentins
thoughts go on to undermine relationships he has based his
sanity on: the difference between sleep and waking, night and
day; the inherent connection between things done, felt, suf
fered, and their significance. The smell of honeysuckle, invading
him and triggering his unbearable sense of his own and of
Caddy’s sexuality, breaks down these “stable” connections; and
Quentin’s attempt to talk himself into tranquility—“saying that
over and over”—ends by doing the reverse: nothing remains
itself, all drifts away from its habitual moorings, becoming “shad
owy paradoxical” as Quentin’s very language—the script by
which he knows himself—chokes on its quest for coherence,
dissolving into the babble of “I was I was not who was not was
not who.”=^ An alien body, a wandering mind, a dizzying sense of
disowned doings, feelings, and sufferings: these come together
in this passage as something we call Quentin. He belongs to
them, but in what sense do they belong to him?
Faulkner’s most powerful strategy for representing this dis
unity, this incoherence that is Quentin, is, of course, the stream
of consciousness technique itself Here is Quentin early in the
chapter:
Because if it were just to hell; if that were all of it. Finished. If things
just finished themselves. Nobody else there but her and me. If we
could just have done something so dreadful that they would have fled
hell except us. I have committed incest I said Father it was I it was
not Dalton Ames And when he put Dalton Ames. Dalton Ames.
Dalton Ames. When he put the pistol in my hand I didn’t. That’s
why I didn’t. He would be there and she would and I would. Dalton
Ames. Dalton Ames. Dalton Ames. If we could have just done
something so dreadful and Father said That’s sad too, people cannot
do anything that dreadful they cannot do anything very dreadful at
all they cannot even remember tomorrow what seemed dreadful
today and I said. You can shirk all things and he said, Ah can you.
And I will look down and see my murmuring bones and the deep
water like wind, like a roof of wind, and after a long time they cannot
distinguish even bones upon the lonely and inviolate sand. . . . (9798)
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If things just finished themselves: Faulknerian stream of con
sciousness fiendishly enacts the way in which things do not finish
themselves. Within this rhetoric Quentin cannot finish his
thought, cannot finish his identity, cannot keep Dalton Ames
and Father and Caddy and honeysuckle from penetrating his
being, cannot keep from quoting his mother, Dilsey, Herbert,
Mrs. Bland, and others. When his desire to be with Caddy alone
is denied, his only other desire is to not be, to put an end to all
this uninvited company that fills his body and mind. Since he
cannot finish himself he will cancel himself
Let us generalize the model of individual identity implicit in
Faulkner’s stream of consciousness representation of Quentin.
Unlike characters in the nineteenth-century novel (which are
typically passed on to us by the narrator as coherent entities,
summarized organisms existing over time), Quentin appears as a
moment-by-moment involuntary recorder of others’ voices, a
sentient receptacle wounded by the shards of their utterances;
the site on which the cacophony of the larger culture registers.
Quentin is a memory-box, a porous container of others’ throw
away discourse. Unable to consolidate what he has absorbed,
unable to shape his own thoughts into the coherence of a tem
poral project, he is a figure in motley. By representing him as
thus adulterate through and through, made up of what is not
himself, Faulkner reveals the pathos of his fantasy of preserving
Caddy’s virginity.
I have spoken only of Quentin, but in a modified form this
paradigm of identity shapes the other characters of the novel as
well. Benjy and Jason, Caddy, Mr. and Mrs. Compson; these
figures are in different ways intolerably penetrated and con
trolled by formulae not of their own making. 3 Faulkner seems
drawn to them in the measure that—fissured themselves, in
debted unknowingly to unworkable scripts—they seek hope
lessly to impose unity upon, to preserve identity within, their
own lives and the lives around them. They seek such unity and
identity through speech, and indeed The Sound and the Fury is
full of sound, of puny humans contradictorily asserting their own
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authority. It is the loud world, we remember, that Quentin
would rescue Caddy from.
What is at stake in this desire to preserve identity, this urgent
need to maintain stable boundaries between the self and the
world? Why is it so difficult (and for many readers painful) to
read Quentin’s section? What does it mean that we as readers
insist on taking all novels—even Faulkner’s and Joyce’s novels—
as “stories” about individual “characters” engaged in “plot”?
Indeed, fiction is (like other forms of narrative) a privileged site
for celebrating the enactment of individual identity. Fiction is
one of the arenas in which the culture tells its fables of selffiood,
of the successful negotiation between a self, on the one hand,
and a world, on the other. And Faulkner’s masterpieces come
into sharpest focus as a territory in which this negotiation is both
urgent and impossible, in which the need for protected bound
aries is exactly as intense as the awareness that these boundaries
cannot be protected. Virginity, incest, and miscegenation;
Sutpen’s Hundred, the McCaslin inheritance, and the wilder
ness—each of these phrases names a crucial Faulknerian space
(psychic or material) in which boundaries have been hopelessly
erected or traumatically overrun. What is it that makes these
enclosed arenas simultaneously precious and beyond preserving?4
*

*

*

I suggest that identity is a privileged term within a Western
vocabulary of individualism. In its primary meaning—that some
thing is always itself—and its secondary implication—that that
selfhood is different from all others—identity makes some very
large promises. 5 It promises sameness over time—an unchang
ing essence at the core of objects (and without which it would be
difficult to hypothesize about objects at all). That is, the self
sameness of objects is intrinsic (to be found within the object
itself) rather than relational (to be found by way of the object’s
membership within a larger group: its inscription within one or
several signifying networks). The term suggests, further, with
respect to human identity, that we are unique creatures, essen
tially different from each other. To privilege individual identity
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in this way is to fantasize a kind of protected sacred place—the
place of ourselves—which would be immune to the vicissitudes
of time and space. It is to allay our anxiety that we may not have
an unchanging core and therefore may take on our meanings
from our affiliations and conditions. It is to fix, enclose, and
affirm our unique difference from others, to say: “That’s who I
am.” By thus reifying our sense of ourselves, by charting it as a
separate essence and putting boundaries around it, we repress,
precisely, that intolerable sense of being-helplessly-caught-upin-the-Other that Faulkner represents in the plight of Quentin
Compson.
This paradigm of identity as an essentialized sacred space
commands not just how we want to think of ourselves but how
we choose to think of art objects as well. The critical position that
best enshrines it is New Criticism, the model of criticism that
has been so influential in this country during our century.® Most
of us in this room who are over forty and under sixty ^ere
probably trained as New Critics. We learned that depth and
unique difference are the hallmark of the work of art. Language
is assumed, within this critical model, to be supremely manage
able; and each work is to be studied in its precious difference
from others, each character to be probed in his rounded whole
ness, each master writer to be praised for the rich inclusiveness
of his personal vision. (All along the tacit assumption was that
life, in its murk and messiness, its ideological confusions, could
not provide such fine-grained distinctions: but art could.)
Close reading was invented and became institutionalized as
a classroom technique for disengaging the essence, the identity,
of the aesthetic object. Through close readings the uniqueness of
the writers vision was identified, and once the individual case
had been scrupulously delineated, it was seen to partake (para
doxically) of the universal as well. That is, the unique vision is
simultaneously, in its wholeness, a universal or human vision. To
speak of universal or human is to be in touch with essence, with
that which is lodged so deeply within the individual that it
escapes the accidents of condition or local affiliation and reflects
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instead something common to the species. In the name of en
compassing all groups, human actually disavows the power of any
group to affect the essence of the unique individual.
As spectators in the presence of the human or the universal,
essences freed by art for our disinterested appreciation, we are
meant to praise. (How often a New Critical classroom assign
ment on a poem or a novel could be distilled to the following
message: praise this object! tell me how finely, disinterestedly,
inclusively it understands life in its inimitable weave of form and
content!) The work, exquisitely beyond bias, stands self-com
plete before us, a microcosm of that ideal identity we would seek
to posit within ourself: a sacred space. Like us, it may be
embedded within other, potentially contaminating networks,
but these networks are secondary. The work’s aesthetic triumph,
like our own fantasized identity, resides in its free-standing
wholeness.
I have tried to word this in such a way that you will see the
connection between how we view the identity of the work of art,
how we view the writer’s identity, and how we view our own.
This distinction between the unique and universal, on the one
hand, and the group-shaped and system-sharing, on the other,
not only affects Faulkner’s texts: it affects conferences on those
texts. For the past two years we at this conference have chosen to
discuss those texts within the “group-shaped” frames of women
and race, and one of the most urgent (though unspoken) ques
tions has been: how can we still think of Faulkner as unique and
universal when it becomes more and more obvious that he is also
(and not just coincidentally) white and male?
For me, the most revealing moment at last year’s conference
occurred when a speaker eloquently reflected on potential com
plexities of motive in two of Faulkner’s characters: the white
deputy in “Pantaloon in Black” and the black man Jesus in “That
Evening Sun.” The speaker concluded that these characters, in
their pain and bewilderment, should be thought of as neither
white nor black, but instead as human. There was an immediate
and audible sigh of satisfaction within a great portion of the
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audience, for this conclusion spoke to our continuous anxiety
about racial differenc^spoke to it by transcending all group
differences and arriving at species universality, at the human. Yet
what black reader of Faulkner will find it more illuminating to
see that white deputy as human rather than white (white here as
crucial limitation and blindness), and what woman reader will
want to see Jesus (who has beaten Nancy before and may now be
about to slit her throat) as human rather than male (male here as
crucial limitation and blindness)? The white deputy and Jesus
act deeply out of their group identity—their race and gender—
and to see them as essentially human is to obscure into sec
ondariness the massive role played by race and gender.
I should say, in closing this anecdote, that a woman came up
after the talk to quarrel with the speaker’s interpretation of
Jesus, and I (who had also come up) raised a question with him
about “human” but defended his gender reading. In the year’s
interim between then and now I have been pondering this
event—it was in fact the germ of this entire paper and the
speaker and I have, since then, discussed together as well the
elusive impress of ideology upon interpretation. For my part, I
now see that the talk and the later disagreements were all of
them instances of the legitimate shaping power of race and
gender. As a white male, the speaker could see something m
Jesus that a black reader might not see (he being focused on a
racial context that the white reader might see beyond); likewise
the woman with a quarrel had a quarrel: she as a woman was
more interested in reading Jesus within a gender context that
was for her primary, not secondary, though for the white male
speaker the gender context might well seem secondary to an
existentialist one. And I now realize that a Marxist might have
come up to the podium and legitimately quarreled with us all,
his focus arising from a matrix of class and economic issues that
we had all scanted.
The point is that there are no universal texts, no universal
readings of them. Each text, like each reading of the text,
achieves its power through its omissions: seeing some things is
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predicated upon blindness to others. The text, like the reader, is
caught up in a variety of unchosen networks; it is inextricably
part of its time and its place. Its identity is inevitably adulterate
and problematic, a function both of its angle of vision upon the
world and of the readers angle of vision upon it.'^Roland Barthes
makes this point shrewdly in his essay on that “universal”
bestseller entitled The Family of Man.7 Barthes notes that this
photographic celebration of our universally shared destiny—that
all over the world we are alike in being born, in growing up, in
working and playing, in growing old and dying—manages sys
tematically to repress a countertruth: that we are born into
different conditions, we grow up with different possibilities, we
have different work and play options (depending on what part of
the world we inhabit and our class orientation), we die at dif
ferent ages and of different diseases (depending on the culture
we live in).® This countertruth is attentive to the differential of
history, whereas The Family of Man focuses upon the immu
tability of nature. Both points of view are valuable, but only one
concedes that it is a point of view. The Family of Man passes itself
off as unedited pictures of nature, of the obvious: as how things
are.
The text that claims to be universal posits, then, an unchang
ing human truth, an essential identity uncontaminated by the
accidents of time, place, and affiliation. Free of bias, it asks to be
taken as a privileged portrait of how things are. 9 Such a text was,
I think, the object of study of New Criticism, and there is
something in us that still seeks to read Faulkner in this way. I
want now to posit another model of identity—this one drawing
on the Marxist philosopher Althusser and the psychoanalytic
theorist Lacan—and then to consider both Absalom, Absalom!
and the activity of this conference from the perspective of this
new model.
*

*

*

Althusser is interested in the paradox at the heart of the term
subject.The subject is simultaneously the free human being
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and the human being subjected to another s system of beliefs and
practices. Ideology is the missing term that enables this paradox,
for ideological practice and the free human subject mutually
constitute each other. “The category of the subject,” writes
Althusser, “is the constitutive category of all ideology . . . insofar
as all ideology has the function (which defines it) of constituting
concrete individuals as subjects.What this means is that we
obtain our sense of uncoerced, unpredictable inwardness
through our spontaneous assent to the social scripts the ide
ologies—that surround us. We assent immediately, to arrange
ments so self-evident as to be invisible, and indeed all well
functioning ideology is invisible in this sense. It is what goes
without saying, it is our daily participation in a “natural” schema
of how things are, our way of wearing our name, our clothes, our
unconscious convictions about the rightness of our procedures.
But we do not generate name, clothes, and convictions out of
ourselves. They may be the material of our identity, but they
come to us from outside, as always already established and
awaiting our spontaneous participation. We join in by accepting
the models thus proposed. As men or women we accept some
socially proposed gender image, if we are Christians we accept
Christ, if we are Americans we accept some version of the
founding fathers, if we are teachers we pursue some compelling
image of teaching. In each case we become ourselves by subject
ing ourselves to a commanding image: we achieve our freedom
by internalizing an external model. Althusser calls this model
ideology, a script whose acceptance ushers us into a particular
version of social reality, a version that we enact insofar as we
remain faithful to the gestures, practices, and beliefs sanctioned
by the script. The key to this model is noncoercion: “the indi
vidual is interpellated as a (free) subject in order that he shall
(freely) accept his subjection, i.e. in order that he shall make the
gestures and actions of his subjection all by himself.
Identity on this model is decentered. We spontaneously (in
deed unconsciously) subscribe to social scripts that thus em
power us. They do empower us, yet they are not quite the same
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thing as us. Is it too much to say that Faulknerian tragedy is
generated precisely by the civil war between these internalized
social scripts and a something within the self more primordial
than social scripts? I turn now to Jacques Lacan for a discussion
of this something more primordial.
According to Lacan we come into our identity only through a
series of alienations, and the earliest ones are decisive. ^3 The
infant, speechless {infans means speechless), absorbs from its
first days bits and pieces of language into itself, and it absorbs as
well the gaze of others. What it knows in addition is the sensa
tion of disconnected body parts; it has as yet no totalizing image
of itself This momentous step occurs during what Lacan calls
the mirror stage: that moment (Lacan sees it beginning roughly
at the sixth month and continuing for another year) when the
infant begins to “recognize” itself as reflected either through the
eyes of its mother or in an actual mirror. The resultant external
image is perceived as a totality—a completed self—and it con
trasts richly, in its wholeness and mobility, with the infant’s own
interior sense of physical uncoordination and turbulent body
parts. In other words, the infant recognizes itself only in an alien
image of wholeness. Lacan writes: “the total form of the body by
which the subject anticipates in a mirage the maturation of his
power is given to him only ... in an exteriority. ” ^4 Or, as he
puts it more simply, “the first synthesis of the ego is essentially
alter ego; it is alienated.’’^5
This first moment of coherent self-knowing is thus a “mirage, ”
and it prefigures the process of unconscious identificatory merg
ing with outer objects that will, for the rest of our lives, affect our
identity as subjects. Lacan calls this dimension of identity Imagi
nary. As one of Lacan’s commentators writes, “The ego is de
veloped in a primordial discordance between natural being and
identification with the forms of the oter world. In other words,
alien images—i.e., not innate—first constitute the ego as an
object of its own identificatory mergers.
The self is thus
“constituted through anticipating what it will become,”^7 built
upon fictions.
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The second stage of identity-formation begins at about eigh
teen months: the time at which the child simultaneously begins
to acquire language skills and to recognize the invisible presence
of the father as a barrier to its desire for merger with the mother.
Reconceiving Freud’s Oedipal drama, Lacan sees the child’s
entry into language as itself a substitute satisfaction for the lost
object—the mother—that the infant shall never again possess.
Language appears in this argument as an alien network made up
of empty differences, of signs that mean only in relation to each
other; it is a system outside the self Henceforth caught up in
this system (which Lacan calls the Symbolic—the paternal field
of Culture’s rules and regulations, of linguistic transactions, of
the Law), the child is doomed to seek in the register of language
and its concepts a wholeness that language by definition cannot
\provide. Language keeps sending us to other language. Thus we
spend our lives trying to say what we want, chasing in the
channel of language for an object that never existed in that
currency in the first place.
These two stages of self-formation posit an inevitable selffissuring. The human subject is a being precariously poised
between Imaginary mergers and Symbolic distinctions; he does
not master either arena. Identity is therefore decentered and
from the beginning adulterate; there is no native self As Lacan
writes, “I think where I am not, therefore I am where I do not
think.
Or, “clarifying ” himself, he writes: “I am not wherever
I am the plaything of my thought; I think of what I am where I do
not think to think.”^9 Or, “clarifying” Lacan, we might say:
“Thinking I was I was not who was not was not who. ” In each
formulation we remain, it seems, the last ones to know exactly
what we are up to, though Faulkner’s wording has an urgency
and a sense of the cost of such vertigo absent from Lacan’s
complacent phrasing. In any event, the social world—its lan
guage, its gestures, its images—penetrates us from the moment
of our birth on: we have never been virginal. Drawing on Al
thusser and Lacan as formulators of a human subject inextricably
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and irrationally permeated by social networks—a human subject
who lives his identity both through participating in ideology and
through primordial Imaginary mergers with the others that sur
round him—I turn now to Absalom, Absalom!
*

*

^

Faulkner almost surely knew nothing of either Althusser or
Lacan, yet Absalom, Absalom! uncannily responds to their en
terprises. The ways in which individuals are born into alien
systems of thinking, feeling, and doing—into ideology—and at
the same time find themselves caught up in a primordial fusion
with others in whom they see themselves mirrored: these con
cerns seem to lie near the heart of the book. As John Irwin has
argued, individual identity in this novel is a matter not of en
closed essences but of specular relationships.^®
The process of vicarious identification is rampant. Rosa and
her identification with Judith and Charles’s courtship, Henry and
his shifting triangular identifications with Judith and with Bon,
Sutpen’s identification with the planter in the big house. Wash
Jones’s identification with Sutpen, Quentin and Shreve’s identifi
cations with Henry and Charles: in each of these crossings an
involuntary psychic merger takes place—across “the devious
intricate channels of decorous ordering ” (139), the boundaries
set up by Culture that tell whom we are like and whom unlike,
whom we can or cannot touch, where, and when. The novel’s
primary image for this desire for merger is touch itself, just as
the novel’s primary image for the cultural prohibition against
touch is the closed door.
Individual identity here remains poignantly incomplete. Even
Charles Bon, in Quentin and Shreve’s final version of him, finds
himself moving past the cool stability of “breathing, pleasure,
darkness” (300) and into the helpless state of yearning. Needing
his father’s recognition and not getting it he thinks, “My God, I
am young, young, and I didn't even know it; they didn’t even tell
me, that I was young” {^21). IAbsalom, Absalom! insists on the
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same kind of fluid incompleteness in its very form. Revising each
finished version of its characters’ identity with another version,
the novel melts down whatever it has consolidated, infusing
youthful instability and passion into materials gone rigid or
dead. “Get on, now . . . But go on . . . Go on ” (260-61)—these
instigating phrases run like a leitmotif throughout the narrative,
fanning the glow of its stalemated materials into the bonfire of an
overpass to love, heating up painful but finished events into
unbearably unfinished ones. Gharles Bon enters this novel dead,
is brought back to life, is shot, is resurrected, is shot again, is
resurrected again, is shot again. Each time he dies it hurts a bit
more, hurts Quentin and Shreve who have lent him something of
themselves, hurts the reader who has lent Quentin and Shreve
(and therefore Charles) something of the reader’s self The nar
rative keeps revisiting its most intransigent materials, rejuvenat
ing and replaying them as a living might-be, then as a meditative
might-have-been, then as a tragic was.
In this creative move to revise its own inheritance, this tor
mented overview of its own wasted terrain, Absalom goes past an
Althusserian vision of ideological consent. It does so through the
resurrectory energy of desire itself, the energy that psycho
analysis respects as transference and that moves through the
incompleteness of individual identity—that of the doers, the
tellers, the readers—and merges with the other. Rather than
accept the limitations of a narrative in which everything has
already happened—the conventional historical novel—or accept
the illusion of a narrative in which everything is yet to happen—
the conventional novel of today, Faulkner combines these two
frames into a narrative of tragic desire. 4]vents come to us in the
double perspective of having already happened, and yet—such
is the desire of the teller—they are rekindled, still happening,
being reimagined, reframed, compelling yet hopeless. This is
the narrative of desire entrapped—can’t matter—and desire re
leased—must matter, of “they mought have kilt us but they aint
whupped us yit” (184).
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Such involuntary mergers recall the Lacanian field of the
Imaginary—the movement of “the immortal brief recent intran
sient blood” (295)—in defiance of the boundaries put forth by
the Symbolic order. Those boundaries, though, are beyond dis
mantling, and not because the authorities dispense enough po
lice to protect them. They are beyond dismantling because
internalized, bred into the very fabric of the individuals uncon
scious feeling and thinking. Henry Sutpen polices himself His
West Virginia father may touch blacks with impunity but, born
and bred in the South, Henry cannot. He screams and vomits
when his father does it, he murders at the intolerable prospect of
his sister doing it. As Althusser claims, ideology is inseparable
from subjecthood itself, and Faulkner tirelessly shows us—in
Quentin Compson, in Joe Christmas, in Charles Etienne SaintValery Bon—the dissolution of the subject that follows upon the
clash within of incompatible ideological scripts.
All great novels involve the clash of ideological scripts, but
most do not represent that clash as beyond individual resolution.
Indeed, as I suggested earlier, fiction is a privileged terrain for
the successful negotiation of self and society, for the persuasive
imagining of individual identity working its way through con
flicts both Imaginary and ideological/1 would hazard that every
best-seller, one way or another, affirms a dominant ideology even
as it points to its rupture or blind spots. Let us consider, for
example, the ways in which two masterpieces written in 1936—
Absalom, Absalom! and Gone with the Wind—play out this issue
of ideological rupture and containment in terms of individual
identity. “
Narrative voice is the novel’s most potent instrument for con
tainment—for conveying the sense of an individual speaker in
control of the conflicts that arise—and Gone with the Wind
comes to us in an uninterrupted and exquisitely satisfying nar
rative voice, a voice everywhere equal to its task, a voice that
knows. Absalom, Absalom! comes to us, by contrast, in a variety
of voices, and the fact that they all sound alike doesn’t help us
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out. Each of these voices either knowingly or unknowingly calls
into question its own authority. This is a case in which more is
less.
If we move to the handling of time and theme, we find a
comparable stability in the best-seller, instability in the experi
mental novel. All of Gone with the Wind is written as though the
past history it is unfolding took place just a few days ago: the
novel never acknowledges its own seventy-five-year vantage
point on the events it records—the pastness of the past. (It
doesn’t acknowledge it but it everywhere exploits it in the
unified vision afforded by retrospect.) Mitchell renders the de
feat of the South as tragic, deserved, and—more to the point—
secondary. She does this by focusing the reader less upon the
issues of the war itself than upon two larger-than-life figures
(Rhett and Scarlet) who stand neither simply for nor against the
lost cause. The trauma of the war, the ways in which it called into
question (still calls into question) our nation’s deepest communal
identity, is thus contained within Scarlet and Rhett’s “immortal ”
love story, ending on the note of the unvanquished human will,
the staying power of individual identity. (A comparison of the
place of Tara and of Sutpen’s Hundred within the economy of
each novel’s ending makes the same point.)
Absalom, Absalom! by contrast, lives uneasily on both sides of
Mitchell’s satisfying time frame. In Absalom the pastness of the
past—its unrecoverability—is foregrounded. Yet the past has
refused, precisely, to pass: it is still present, still unfinished, still
beyond managing. 1808, 1833, 1859, 1865, 1909-10: the nar
rative moves bewilderingly back and forth among these times,
suggesting that the racial issues over which the war was fought
retain their power to haunt and confuse: who is black in Absalom?
how much black blood does it take to be black? In place of Gone
with the Wind’s easy separation between black blacks and white
whites, Absalom finds black and white to be inextricable parts of
each other’s identity.
Gone with the Wind “masters ” the trauma of the Civil War,
then, by containing it within a love story of two strong individu-
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als, narrated by a coherent and capable narrative voice, one
which keeps intact key distinctions between white and black,
self and system, past and present, energy and weakness; distinc
tions upon which twentieth-century American culture’s most
confident images of itself are founded. In Absalom all these
distinctions have become problematic. No narrator can deliver
this material because none has mastered it. None can speak from
a later cultural vantage point of superior hindsight and sort it all
out. And this means literally that the culture since 1865 has been
unable to provide the narrators with a perspective—a consoling
ideology—that will make that cataclysmic war go down. It sticks
in the craw, and in so doing it shatters the conventional fictional
contract between self and society. Absalom is an experimental
novel, precisely, in its refusal of these blandishments, these
conventions of retrospective mastery.^Its frustrations are passed
on to us as our own; we do not feel wise reading it, we do not feel
sure of ourselves—of who we are—while reading it. ^3
In fact, Faulkner’s novel (as opposed to Mitchell’s) seems
designed to frustrate our answer to the simple question that
inaugurates all queries about identity: who is---------? who is
'Thomas Sutpen? who is Charles Bon? who is Quentin Compson?
It is not that the question cannot be answered but that the novel
keeps on answering it in different ways. Thomas Sutpen is a
demon, a tragic hero, a successful planter; he is also a psychically
arrested child, a mountain man, white trash. Who he is depends
on when and where you look at him, and who is doing the
looking. He looks one way to a woman, another to a man,
another to a disowned son, another to a disillusioned classicist,
another to his quietly desperate son, another to a Canadian.
These competing views of Sutpen’s identity do not embarrass the
novel; they enable it. Character in Absalom lives openly in
someone else’s talk; there is no illusion here of unmediated
identity, of identity as enclosed essence. ^4 A different narrator, a
different issue (miscegenation, say, rather than incest) produces
a different identity.
What indeed is Absalom, Absalom! “itself ”? Is it the material
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378 pages within the Modern Library covers that most of us
know? John Irwin has shown its astonishing intertextually shared
life with The Sound and the Fury. Less spectacularly, Noel Polks
new edition of The Sound and the Fury indicates the difficulty of
containing any text within its material bounds. Consider the
history of The Sound and the Fury’s Appendix. ^5 To do so, we
should first go forward to Absalom, Absalom!, for in concluding
that novel in the mid-1930s Faulkner composed a chronology, a
genealogy, and a map. Charmed, perhaps, by the illusion of
containment that such instruments convey, Faulkner went on to
write—some ten years later—an Appendix to The Sound and the
Fury, liking it so much that he argued for its appearance at the
beginning of the novel. (Probably half of you in this room first
encountered the novel, as I did, in this format, joined with As I
Lay Dying.) For sixteen years this text held sway; then, at the
time of Faulkners death, a new edition appeared with the Ap
pendix placed more discreetly at the end of the novel proper.
Some twenty-two years later, in 1984, under the supervision of
Noel Polk, the most recent edition of The Sound and the Fury
appeared, this time altogether without the Appendix. Which is
The Sound and the Fury? If I have told the story properly, you
will find the question sounding now a bit naive. The amount of
critical exigesis dependent upon the originally absent and now
discarded Appendix is weighty indeed, and it is not limited to
undergraduates who don’t know better. There are, I conclude,
several Sound and Furys afloat (not that they are all of equal
value), and whichever we prefer changes in yet other ways when
we try to calculate its interaction with Absalom, Absalom!
*

*

*

Character and text not only exhibit changing identities; liter
ary history is founded upon such changes. We all know relevant
examples: the Romantics’ Milton (of the Devil’s party without
knowing it) is not the Milton of the seventeenth century; T. S.
Eliot’s inauguration of John Donne as a major poet removes him
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from his Elizabethan context and places him in Eliot’s ongoing
battle with Wordsworth and Tennyson; Jane Eyre as reconceived
by contemporary feminists is a text of the 1970s as much as of the
1840s; Uncle Tom’s Cabin goes from best-sellerdom in the 1850s
to obscurity for a hundred years and back into acclaim once
again, now being enlisted in the contemporary battle against
Modernist canons of race, gender, form, and theme; D. H.
Lawrence, once one of the four or five twentieth-century dar
lings of survey courses of English literature, is at present disap
pearing silently from our syllabi.
These are not capricious changes. They testify to the fact that
we do not so much receive literary masterpieces, intact, as
produce them, adulterate.^® The identity of texts is not essential
but contextual; their value is inescapably conditioned by current
canons of assessment. No writer comes to us “as he is,” not even
Faulkner. How can we see him except through the interpretive
eyes of Sartre and Malraux, or Olga Vickery, or Cleanth Brooks,
or John Irwin, or John Matthews—^which is to say through the
concomitant lenses of Sartre and Malraux’s existentialism, Vick
ery’s New Criticism, Brooks’s sympathy with Southern culture,
Irwin’s Nietzsche and Freud, Matthews’s Derrida? I have in this
sentence immersed Faulkner within a fog of names, yet this is,
whether we are conscious of it or not, the only access we have to
him. “Faulkner” is misleading shorthand for a complex and
many-voiced enterprise that operates under the cover of his
name.
Individual identity is likewise misleading shorthand for a eomplex and many-voiced enterprise that operates under the cover
of that phrase. So long as we are physically separate from each
other, demonstrably lodged in separate bodies, we shall prob
ably never coneede the degree to which we depend upon the
other and upon system in order to eonstitute the self. Equally, so
long as we look solid, we shall deny the terrifying extent of our
liquidity. Yet it is, so to speak, the liquid in us—what Faulkner
calls the blood—that engages incessantly in acts of transference,
of identificatory merger. Because our identity is perpetually

igo

PHILIP M. WEINSTEIN

unfinished, because we are never coincident with ourselves, we
read books, teach students, and attend Faulkner conferences.
I have been using the pronoun “we” with abandon, but the
“we” in this room is no common entity. Our orientations are here
as well, invisibly differentiating us from some and joining us to
others. Indeed, many of us are wearing a badge conspicuously
placed upon our person, and this badge tells an interesting story.
It says that we are here in our discrete bodies but not only here;
we are also there, lodged in our former affiliations (and if the
badge says Berkeley it suggests something different from Buf
falo, something different again from Swarthmore or Ole Miss).
We speak out of those affiliations, and are heard in terms of
them, as we speak out of and are heard in terms of our race and
gender.
Yet we do come together under a common umbrella that is
appropriately named “Faulkner. ” It is the site less of our individ
ual than of our transpersonal professional activity. Many of us are
rewarded—either figuratively or literally—for coming to these
conferences and attending thus to our place in the Symbolic field
of reputations and responsibilities. Prestige and power, in how
ever small a degree, are at stake. In addition, and more agreea
bly, “Faulkner” serves as a sort of absent father who enables
fleeting sibling relations among erstwhile strangers spending a
week together in each others company. Not kin, we do, becanse
of him, for moments feel like kin. I’ll close by suggesting,
however, that this conference is the site as well, and perhaps
more profoundly, of our common acts of imaginary transference,
the locus of our hopeless desire to merge our incompleteness
with Faulkner’s beckoning authority. Dead, he lives. Continually
re-invented, he speaks to us. “Freed ... of time and flesh,
like old Colonel Sartoris or Colonel Sutpen, he broods over us all
in the form of our impassioned and incompatible inventions of
him.
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NOTES
1. I cite from the 1962 Vintage edition of The Sound and the Fury and from the 1951
Modem Library edition of Absalom, Absalom!
2. The best full-length study of Faulknerian psychic stmctures menaced by pressures they
cannot control is Gail L. Mortimer’s phenomonological Faulkners Rhetoric of Loss (Austin:
University of Texas Press, 1983), Andre Bleikasten’s The Most Splendid Failure (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1976) recurs frequently to this concern. See especially the chapters on
Quentin, 90-143, For a reading of this vertigo in terms of the play of difference and deferral
inherent in the system of language itself see John Matthews, The Play of Faulkners Language
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982).
3. Bleikasten is acute on Jason’s enclosure within the social stereotypes of his region: “His
ideas are all second-hand, and . . . they all come from the threadbare ideology of his cultural
environment ” (164).
4. For further discussion of the idea of “sanctuary, ” see my “ Precarious Sanctuaries:
Protection and Exposure in Faulkner’s Fiction, ” Studies in American Fiction, 6 (1978), 173-91.
5. Judith Egan Gardiner’s “On Female Identity and Writing by Women” in Elizabeth
Abel, ed., Writing and Sexual Difference (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983) provides
an excellent overview of psychoanalytic models of identity from Freud through Erikson and
Chodorow. The problematic of individual identity is, of course, a common theme of poststmcturalist, psychoanalytic, and Marxist criticism.
6. Ihe preeminent spokesmen of New Criticism—^Allen Tate, John Crowe Ransom,
Cleanth Brooks, and William Wimsatt, to name four—^have decisively shaped the institutional
study of literature in this country since the 1930s; their major texts are sufficiently well-known
not to require identification here. For critical assessments of their enterprise, see Frank
Lentricchia, After The New Criticism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), Terry
Eagleton, Literary Theory: An Introduction (Oxford, Eng.: Blackwell, 1983), and William E.
Cain, The Crisis in Criticism (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984).
7. Mythologies (Paris: Seuil, 1957), trans. Annette Levers (New York: HiU and Wang,
1972), 100-102.
8. Barthes writes: “Any classic humanism postulates that in scratching the history of men a
little, the relativity of their institutions or the superficial diversity of their skins (but why not ask
the parents of Emmet Till, the young Negro assassinated by the Whites what they think of The
Great Family of Man?), one very quickly reaches the sofid rock of a universal human nature ”
(101).
9. Survey courses of English literature find it difficult to avoid the same idealist perspec
tive. The “pageantry” of masterpieces fiom Beowulf to Virginia Woolf emerges as a sequence of
works that resemble nothing so much as each other in their fine-grained and unbiased
universality. The differential history that occasions the production and reception of all these
works is marginalized in such courses, if not repressed.
10. The central Althusser text for my purposes is “Ideology and Ideological State Appara
tuses,” in his Lenin and Philosophy, and Other Essays (London: New Left Books, 1971). The
major attempt to produce an Althusserian model of literary theory is Pierre Macherey’s Pour une
Theorie de la production litteraire (Paris: Francois Maspero, 1966). The work of Terry Eagleton
and of Fredric Jameson is considerably indebted to both Althusser and Macherey. See especially
Eagleton’s Criticism and Ideology (London: New Left Books, 1976) and Jameson’s The Political
Unconscious (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981), 9-102. Other useful commentary on
Althusser includes Tony Bennett’s Formalism and Marxism (London: Methuen, 1979); James
Kavanaugh’s “Marxism’s Althusser: Toward a Politics of Literary Theory, ” in diacritics, 12 (1982),
25—45;
William Dowling’s Jameson, Althusser, Marx (Ith^^a: Cornell University Press, 1984).
11. Althusser, 171.
12. Ibid., 182.
13. The most useful collection of Lacan’s major essays in translation remains Ecrits: A
Selection, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Norton, 1977). The essay most relevant to this
portion of my argument is “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the I, ” 1-7. Lacan’s
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work is notoriously difficult, and I have benefited greatly by the following discussions: Anika
Lemaire, Jacques Lacan, trans. David Macey (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977); Fredric
Jameson, “Imaginary and Symbolic in Lacan,” in Shoshana Felman, ed.. Literature and
Psychoanalysis (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Lfniversity Press, 1982), 338-95; Luce Irigaray,
Ce Sexe qui n’en est pas un (Paris: Minuit, 1977); Jane Gallop, The Daughter’s Seduction (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1982), and her Reading Lacan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985);
and Elbe Ragland-Sullivan, Jacques Lacan and the Philosophy of Psychoanalysis (Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 1986),
14. Lacan, 2.
15. Lacan, Seminaire 3, as quoted by Ragland-Sullivan, 275,
16. Ragland-Sullivan, 2.
17. Gallop, Reading Lacan, 81.
ik Lacan, 166.
19. Ibid,
20. Irwin, Doubling and Incest/Repetition and Revenge (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1975).
21. The best work I know of on the role of desire in the production of literary texts is that of
Peter Brooks, Reading for the Plot (New York: Knopf 1984), and of Charles Bemheimer,
‘Toward a Psychopoetics of the Text,” in his Flaubert and Kafka (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1984), 1-44,
22. Eric Sundquist touches briefly on this comparison in his Faulkner: The House Divided
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983), Peter Brooks brilliantly explores the
logic of the intertwined Mure of narrative and genealogical authority in his “Incredulous
Narration: Absalom, Absalom!" in Comparative Literature, 34 (1982), 247-68.
23. Not enough critical attention is generally paid to the sense of readerly empowerment or
incapacity wrought by a given texts “narrative contract.” Insofar as a narrative invokes (in its
forms even more than its themes) the comforts of the already-known, it consolidates the
ideological bonding between reader and culture: it makes one feel rich in common wisdom.
Virginia Woolfs commentary in A Room of One’s Own (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World,
1957) on this aspect of reading is unsurpassable:
But the effect [of an unconventional text that the narrator is reading] was somehow baffling;
one conld not see a wave heaping itself a crisis coming round the next comer. Therefore I
could not plume myself either upon the depths of my feelings and my profound knowledge of
the human heart. For whenever I was about to feel the usual things in the usual places, al»ut
love, about death, the annoying creature twitched me away, as if the important thing were just
a little further on. And thus she made it impossible for me to roll out my sonorous phrases
about “elemental feelings,” the “common stuff of humanity,” “depths of the human heart,”
and all those other phrases which support us in our belief that, however clever we may be on
top, we are very serious, very profound and very humane underneath. She made me feel, on
the contrary, that instead of being serious and profound and humane, one might be—^and the
thought was far less seductive—merely lazy minded and conventional into the bargain. (95)
24. John Matthews richly opens up this dimension of characterization in his chapter on
Absalom, Absalom! in The Play of Faulkner’s Language. For a study of the ways in which the
novel’s entire representational project is dependent upon voice, see also Stephen M. Ross, “The
Evocation of Voice in Absalom, Absalom!,’’ in Essays in Literature, 8 (1981), 135-49.
25. Noel Polk discusses these issues at length in his Editorial Handbook on The Sound and
the Fury. In a telephone discussion of 3 July 1987 Noel Polk spoke to me of some of Faulkner’s
reasons in the mid-forties for wanting to give a privileged position to the Appendix, yet without
“pandering ” to those who would refuse to struggle with the body of the text itseE
26. To Marx’s question, “Where does the eternal charm of Greek art come from? ” Etienne
Balibar and Pierre Macherey respond as follows:
There is no good answer to this question, quite simply because there is no eternal charm in
Greek art: for the Iliad, a fragment of universal literature, used in this instance as a vehicle for
memory, is not the Iliad produced by the material life of the Greeks, which was not a ‘book’
nor even a ‘myth’ in our sense of the word, which we would like to apply retrospectively.
Homer’s Iliad, the ‘work’ of an author’ exists only for us, and in relation to new material
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conditions into which it has been reinscribed and reinvested with a new significance, , , . To
go further; it is as if we ourselves had written it (or at least composed it anew). Works of art are
processes and not objects, for they are never produced once and for all, but are continually
susceptible to ‘reproduction’: in feet, they only find an identity and a content in this continui
process of transformation. There is no eternal art, there are no fixed and immutable works.
(Quoted in Bennett, Formalism and Marxism, 68)
27. William Faulkner, Sartoris (New York: Signet, 1964), 19.

